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In the collective-risk social dilemma, players lose their personal endowments if contributions to the common
pool are too small. This fact alone, however, does not always deter selfish individuals from defecting. The
temptations to free-ride on the prosocial efforts of others are strong because we are hardwired to maximize
our own fitness regardless of the consequences this might have for the public good. Here we show that the
addition of risky assets to the personal endowments, both of which are lost if the collective target is not reached,
can contribute to solving the collective-risk social dilemma. In infinite well-mixed populations risky assets
introduce new stable and unstable mixed steady states, whereby the stable mixed steady state converges to full
cooperation as either the risk of collective failure or the amount of risky assets increases. Similarly, in finite well-
mixed populations the introduction of risky assets enforces configurations where cooperative behavior thrives.
In structured populations cooperation is promoted as well, but the distribution of assets amongst the groups is
crucial. Surprisingly, we find that the completely rational allocation of assets only to the most successful groups
is not optimal, and this regardless of whether the risk of collective failure is high or low. Instead, in low-risk
situations bounded rational allocation of assets works best, while in high-risk situations the simplest uniform
distribution of assets among all the groups is optimal. These results indicate that prosocial behavior depends
sensitively on the potential losses individuals are likely to endure if they fail to cooperate.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative behavior is essential for the maintenance of
public resources and for their preservation for future gener-
ations [1–7]. However, human cooperation is often threatened
by the lure of short-term advantages that can be accrued only
by means of freeriding and defecting. Bowing to such tempta-
tions leads to an unsustainable use of common resources, and
ultimately such selfish behavior may lead to the “tragedy of
the commons” [8]. There exist empirical and theoretical evi-
dence in favor of the fact that our climate is subject to exactly
such a social dilemma [9–13]. And recent research concern-
ing the climate change has revealed that it is in fact the risk of
a collective failure that acts as perhaps the strongest motivator
for cooperative behavior [11, 14–16].
The most competent theoretical framework for the study
of such problems, inspired by empirical data and the fact
that failure to reach a declared global target can have se-
vere long-term consequences, is the so-called collective-risk
social dilemma [17–19]. As the name suggests, this evolu-
tionary game captures the fact discovered in the experiments
that a sufficiently high risk of a collective failure can signif-
icantly elevate the chances for coordinating actions and for
altogether avoiding the problem of vanishing public goods.
Recent research concerning collective-risk social dilemmas
has revealed that complex interaction networks, heterogene-
ity, wealth inequalities as well as migration can all support the
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evolution of cooperation [20–26] (for a comprehensive review
see [27]). Moreover, sanctioning institutions can also promote
public cooperation [28–31]. More specifically, it has been
shown that a decentralized, polycentric, bottom-up approach
involving multiple institutions instead of a single, global one
provides significantly better conditions both for cooperation
to thrive as well as for the maintenance of such institutions in
collective-risk social dilemmas [16]. Voluntary rewards have
also been shown to be effective means to overcome the co-
ordination problem and to ensure cooperation, even at small
risks of collective failure [32]. The study of collective-risk
social dilemmas can thus inform relevantly on the mitigation
of global challenges, such as the climate change [33], but it
is also important to make further steps towards more realis-
tic and sophisticated models, as outlined in the recent review
by Pacheco et al. [27] and several enlightening commentaries
that appeared in response.
Here we consider the collective-risk social dilemma, where
in addition to the standard personal endowments, players own
additional assets that are prone to being lost if the collective
target is not reached. Indeed, individual asset has been con-
sidered in the behavioral experiments regarding the collective-
risk social dilemma [13]. However, different from the exper-
imental study that investigates the interaction between wealth
heterogeneity and meeting intermediate climate targets [13],
we here explore in detail whether and how the so-called risky
assets provide additional incentives for individuals to cooper-
ate in well-mixed and structured populations. It is important to
emphasize that, within our setup, individuals might lose more
from a failed collective action than they can gain if the same
action is successful. Naturally, this constitutes an important
feedback for the selection of the most appropriate strategy. A
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2simple example from real life to illustrate the relevance of our
approach is as follows: Imagine farmers living around a river
that often floods. The farmers needs to invest into a dam to
prevent the floods from causing damage. If the farmers co-
operate and successfully build the dam, they will be able to
enjoy the harvest. However, if the farmers fail to build the
dam, they will lose not only the harvest, but they will also
incur property damage to their fields, houses and stock. Fur-
ther to the motivation of our research, it is also often the case
that individuals have limited investment capabilities, which
they have to carefully distribute among many groups. In other
words, individuals may participate in several collective-risk
social dilemmas, for example in each with a constant contribu-
tion [34, 35]. Rationally, however, individuals tend to allocate
their asset into groups so as to avoid, or at least minimize, po-
tential losses based on the information concerning risk in the
different groups.
To account for these realistic scenarios, we consider the
collective-risk social dilemma with risky assets in finite and
infinite well-mixed populations, as well as in structured pop-
ulations. We first explore how the introduction of risky as-
sets affects the evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed popula-
tions, where we observe new stable and unstable mixed steady
states, whereby the stable mixed steady state converges to
full cooperation in dependence on the risk. Subsequently, we
turn to structured populations, where the distribution of assets
amongst the groups where players are members becomes cru-
cial. In general, we will show that the introduction of risky
assets can promote the evolution of cooperation even at low
risks, both in well-mixed and in structured populations, and
by doing so thus contributes to the resolution of collective-
risk social dilemmas.
II. COLLECTIVE-RISK SOCIAL DILEMMA WITH RISKY
ASSETS
A. Minimal model with risky assets in well-mixed populations
We first consider the simplest collective-risk social
dilemma game with constant individual assets. From a well-
mixed population, N players are chosen randomly to form a
group for playing the game. In the group, each player y with
the amount of asset a can choose to cooperate with strategy
Sy = 1 or defect with strategy Sy = 0. Cooperators con-
tribute a cost c to the collective target while defectors con-
tribute nothing. If all the contributions within the group either
reach or exceed the collective target T , each player y within
the group obtains the benefit b (b > c > 0), such that the net
payoff is Py = b − cSy . However, if the collective target is
not reached, all the players within the group lose their invest-
ment and asset with probability r, such that the net payoff is
then Py = −cSy − a, while with probability 1− r the payoff
remains the same if the collective target T is reached. Based
on these definitions, the payoff of player y with strategy Sy in
a group with j cooperators is
Py(j) = bθ(j − T ) + b(1− r)[1− θ(j − T )]
− ra[1− θ(j − T )]− cSy, (1)
where θ(ω) = 0 if ω < 0 and θ(ω) = 1 otherwise.
We emphasize that an individual will suffer from a risk to
lose everything (the investment and the asset) it has, if the
collective target is not reached in the minimal model. This
is in line with the original definition of the collective-risk so-
cial dilemma [10, 11, 17]. Different from the original model,
however, in our case the asset together with the investment
can be more than the expected benefit of mutual cooperation.
As argued in the Introduction, such scenarios do exist in real-
ity, and as we will show in the Results section, the risky as-
sets influence significantly the evolutionary dynamics in both
well-mixed and structured populations. We also refer to the
Appendix for details with regards to the performed analysis.
B. Extended model with asset allocation in structured
populations
We here extend the collective-risk social dilemma game
with risky assets to be played on the square lattice with pe-
riodic boundary conditions, where L2 players are arranged
into overlapping groups of size N = 5 such that everyone
is connected to its four nearest neighbors. Accordingly, each
individual belongs to five different groups and it participates
in five collective-risk games. Concerned for the loss of its as-
sets, each individual y aims to transfer these assets into those
groups that have a lower probability to fail to reach the col-
lective target. With the information at hand from the previous
round of the game, player y at time t transfers the asset amy (t)
into the group Gm centered on player m according to
amy (t) = a
[1− rm(t− 1)]α∑
n∈Gy [1− rn(t− 1)]α
, (2)
where rm(t−1) = r if at time t−1 the number of cooperators
nmc (t−1) < T and rm(t−1) = 0 otherwise, and α is the allo-
cation strength of the asset. Here, we mainly consider α ≥ 0,
given that players generally prefer to allocate their asset into
a relatively safe environment. We note that α = 0 means allo-
cating the asset equally into all the groups without taking into
account the information about risk. Accordingly, we will re-
fer to this allocation scheme as uniform or equal. Conversely,
α = +∞means that individuals allocate their assets only into
the most successful groups. We will refer to this as the fully
rational allocation scheme. Lastly, for 0 < α < +∞, we have
the so-called bounded rational allocation of assets.
In agreement with the above definitions, the payoff of
player y at time t with strategy Sy(t) and being member of
the group that is centered on player m is
Pmy (t) = bθ[n
m
c (t)− T ] + b(1− r){1− θ[nmc (t)− T ]}
− ramy (t){1− θ[nmc (t)− T ]} − cSy(t). (3)
3FIG. 1: (Color online) Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation and defection in the collective-risk social dilemma with risky assets, as observed
in well-mixed populations. (a) The stable equilibria (solid line) and unstable equilibria (dash line) as a function of the asset a in infinite
populations. (b) Stationary distribution of cooperation in finite populations for different values of individual asset a (see legend) in the
presence of mutation µ (see Appendix for details). Other parameters values are: N = 5, T = 3, c/b = 0.1, r = 0.2 in (a), and N = 5,
T = 3, Z = 50, c/b = 0.1, r = 0.2, µ = 0.01 in (b).
The total payoff at time t is then simply the accumulation of
payoffs from each of the five individual groups where player
y is member, given as Py =
∑
m P
m
y (t).
After the accumulation of payoffs as described above, each
player y is allowed to learn from one randomly chosen neigh-
bor z with a probability given by the Fermi function [36, 37]
p = [1 + exp−β(Pz−Py)]−1, (4)
where in agreement with the settings in finite well-mixed pop-
ulations (see Appendix for details), we use the intensity of
selection β = 2.0. Further with regards to the simulations de-
tails, we note that initially each player is designated either as
a cooperator or defector with equal probability, and it equally
allocates its asset into all the groups in which it is involved.
Monte Carlo simulations are carried out for the population on
the square lattice. We emphasize there exist ample evidence,
especially for games that are governed by group interactions
[38–40], in favor of the fact that using the square lattice suf-
fices to reveal all the relevant evolutionary outcomes. Because
the system may reach a stationary state where cooperators and
defectors coexist in the finite structured population in the ab-
sence of mutation [41], we determine the fraction of coop-
erators when it becomes time-independent. The final results
were obtained over 100 independent initial conditions to fur-
ther increase accuracy, and their robustness has been tested on
populations ranging from L2 = 2500 to 105 in size.
III. RESULTS
A. Well-mixed populations
We begin by showing the results obtained in well-mixed
populations, when individual risky assets are incorporated
into the collective-risk social dilemma as described by the
minimal model. In infinite well-mixed populations, accord-
ing to the replicator equation, it can be observed that only
the presence of a high risk leads to two additional, interior
equilibria beside the two boundary equilibria x = 0 (stable)
and x = 1 (unstable) in the standard collective-risk social
dilemma (Appendix A) [17]. The unstable interior equilib-
rium, if it exists, divides the range [0, 1] of x into two basins
of attraction. In other words, when there is no risk or a low
risk, the population has no interior equilibria, and the only sta-
ble equilibrium is at x = 0, corresponding to the emergence
of full defection [Fig. 1(a)]. However, in this unfavorable sit-
uation, we find that the introduction of risky assets can lead
to the emergence of two mixed internal equilibria, which ren-
ders cooperation viable and in fact yields similar effects as a
high risk environment. Furthermore, we find that as the as-
set increases, the stable interior equilibrium rapidly increases
closely to one, while the unstable interior equilibrium rapidly
decreases closely to zero [Fig. 1(a)] (see Appendix A for more
analytical results).
In finite well-mixed population, we present the stationary
distribution of cooperation for different values of asset a for a
population of size Z = 50, where the group size N = 5 and
the threshold T = 3 have been used, as shown in Fig. 1(b). It
is worth pointing out that the stationary distribution character-
izes the pervasiveness in time of a given configuration of the
population in the presence of behavioral mutations (see Ap-
pendix for details). We see that in the absence of individual
assets, the population spends most of the time in configura-
tions where defectors prevail, especially at low risks of col-
lective failure. However, when risky assets are introduced,
the population begins to spend more time in configurations
where cooperative behavior thrives. In particular, as the as-
set increases to a high value, the population spends most of
the time in configurations where cooperators prevail, while it
4FIG. 2: (Color online) Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation and defection in the collective-risk social dilemma with risky assets in structured
populations. Top row depicts the stationary fraction of cooperators as a function of the asset a for different values of allocation strength α. The
risk value is r = 0.2 in (a) and r = 0.5 in (b). Bottom row depicts the contour plot of the fraction of cooperators as a function of the asset a
and the allocation strength α, as obtained for the risk value r = 0.2 in (c) and r = 0.5 in (d). Other parameters values are: c/b = 0.1, N = 5,
and T = 3.
spends little time in configurations where defectors prevail.
These results highlight that the introduction of risky assets
into the theoretical model of the collective-risk social dilemma
[17] is found to raise the chances of coordinating actions and
escaping the tragedy of the commons. Accordingly, we con-
clude that individual assets significantly enhance the positive
impact of risk on the evolution of cooperation.
B. Structured populations
We continue with presenting the results obtained in struc-
tured populations, where at each time step an individual par-
ticipates in five collective-risk dilemma games and allocates
its assets as described by the extended model. Figure 2 shows
the fraction of cooperation in the stationary state for two dif-
ferent values of the risk r. It can be observed that the fraction
of cooperators increases steadily with increasing the value of
asset a, which is in agreement with the results obtained in
well-mixed populations. Moreover, the fraction of coopera-
tors increases with increasing a irrespective of the value of
risk r and the allocation strength α. More precisely, when the
risk is small [Fig. 2(a) and (c)], defectors always dominate if
a < 12, and this regardless of the value of α. On the other
hand, if a > 12, with increasing α the fraction of cooperators
first increases, reaches a maximum, but then decreases slowly.
This indicates that there exists an optimal allocation strength
which can maximize the level of cooperation. In other words,
neither uniform allocation nor completely rational allocation
is optimal if the risk r is small. Instead, only bounded ratio-
nal allocation ensures the highest cooperation levels. When
the risk is large [Fig. 2(b) and (d)] the fraction of coopera-
tors still increases with increasing the asset value a, but de-
creases with increasing the allocation strength α. Specifically,
for 0 < a < 8 the fraction of cooperators monotonously de-
creases with increasing α. For larger assets, however, full co-
operation is achieved by uniform allocation, but the same can
also be attained with α values that are somewhat larger than
zero. But as the value of α increases further, the fraction of
cooperators slowly decreases. This can be counteracted by
5FIG. 3: (Color online) Successful evolution of cooperation and the optimal allocation scheme of individual assets. Panel (a) depicts the
stationary fraction of cooperators in dependence on the risk r and the allocation strength α, as obtained for a = 25. Panel (b) depicts the
typical dependence of the fraction of cooperators on the allocation strength α at r = 0.3 and r = 0.5, which are indicated by white dash lines
in panel (a). Panel (c) depicts the optimal allocation strength αopt that maximizes the fraction of cooperators in dependence on the risk r.
Other parameters values are: a = 25, c/b = 0.1, N = 5, and T = 3.
increasing the value of a, since then the range of α values
where full cooperation is attained increases. Taken together,
these results indicate that completely rational allocation of as-
sets is not optimal for the successful evolution of cooperation.
Instead, in low-risk situations bounded rational allocation of
assets works best, while in high-risk situations the simplest
uniform distribution of assets among all the groups is optimal.
In order to study how the reported dependence of the frac-
tion of cooperators on allocation strength relies on the value
of risk, we first show the stationary fraction of cooperators
as a function of risk and allocation strength together at a cer-
tain asset value a = 25 in Fig. 3(a). It can be observed that
for risk r < 0.18 defectors always dominate the population,
regardless of the value of α. For 0.18 < r < 0.46, there ex-
ists an intermediate value of α that maximizes the fraction of
cooperators. For 0.46 < r < 0.55, the fraction of cooper-
ators decreases with increasing α. Finally, for even larger r
values, cooperators always dominate the population. Results
presented in fig. 3(b) show two typical behaviors depicting the
dependence of the cooperation level on the allocation strength
at intermediate values of the risk, as reported in Fig. 2. We
stress that the range of the risk values for the typical outcomes
depends on other parameters, but the existence of these results
is robust against the variations of the parameters (see Fig. 5 for
details). Moreover, we compute the optimal value of the al-
location strength αopt for several intermediate risk values, as
shown in Fig. 3(c). We see that αopt decreases with increasing
r, and finally reaches zero. This result highlights that with in-
creasing the risk the optimal allocation scheme of risky assets
gradually translates from bounded rational to the completely
uniform allocation.
To explain these results, we continue by showing a series of
snapshots depicting the spatial distribution of strategies over
time. When producing the snapshots we use different colors
not just for cooperators and defectors, but also for distinguish-
ing whether an individuals’ central group is successful or not.
More precisely, blue (yellow) color denotes cooperators (de-
fectors) whose central group succeeds to reach the collective
target. On the other hand, green (pink) color denotes cooper-
ators (defectors) whose central group fails to reach the collec-
tive target.
In the top three rows of Fig. 4, we show the representa-
tive sequences for three different values of α, all obtained at
a relatively low value of risk. When the risk is small, de-
fectors have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators [17],
and they utilize this advantage by gathering the benefit and ul-
timately becoming a successful strategy. For low α (top row
of Fig. 4), both cooperators and defectors allocate the asset
equally to all the groups. The uniform allocation cannot re-
verse the direction of invasion of defectors since both cooper-
ators and defectors may lose a similar amount of asset at a low
risk probability if they put the asset into a predominantly de-
fective group. Gradually, the success of defectors easily drives
the community into the tragedy of the commons, which is in-
dicated by the emergence of pink defectors. Note that isolated
islands of cooperators are in the sea of pink defectors, and fi-
nally they disappear completely. For intermediate values of α
(second row of Fig. 4), individuals tends to put most of their
asset into the successful groups. Thus, islands of cooperators
can more easily preserve their assets than islands of defectors,
even if the risk is low. Hence, cooperators do not lose their
assets as much as defectors. Due to the introduction of risky
assets, individual net payoffs, especially the payoffs from a
failed group, depends strongly on the risk of collective failure.
Thus, grouped blue cooperators are likely to have a higher
payoff, at least locally. At the same time, yellow defectors
remain successful if they are in the vicinity of cooperators,
because then they can also preserve most of their assets and
also enjoy most of the benefits from the surrounding success-
ful groups. But once they invade their neighboring coopera-
tors, they fast become pink defectors. Although pink defectors
who are around blue cooperators also put most of their assets
into the blue cooperators’ central group, and thus preserve the
part of asset, they still put some assets into the neighboring
unsuccessful groups where the centered individual is a green
cooperator or a pink defector. Groups around green coopera-
tors can partake the assets of pink defectors, which essentially
protects the neighboring blue cooperators. Although the loss
6FIG. 4: (Color online) Spatial pattern distribution as observed from an randomly initial state at risk r = 0.2 (top three rows) and r = 0.5
(bottom two rows). For r = 0.2 the allocation strength is α = 0 [from (a) to (d)], α = 5 [from (e) to (h)], and α = 15 [from (i) to (l)]. For
r = 0.5 the allocation strength is α = 0 [from (m) to (p)] and α = 10 [from (q) to (t)]. Cooperators whose focal group succeeds (fails) are
denoted blue (green), while defectors whose focal group succeeds (fails) are denoted yellow (pink). Other parameters are T = 3, c/b = 0.1,
and a = 25.
7FIG. 5: (Color online) The robustness of the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma with risky assets. Panel (a) depicts
the fraction of cooperators as a function of the allocation strength α for different values of T and r, as obtained for a = 25, N = 5, and
c/b = 0.1. Panel (b) depicts the fraction of cooperators as a function of the allocation strength α for different values of r and a, as obtained
for T = 3, N = 5 and a larger c/b = 0.2 value. Panel (c) depicts the fraction of cooperators as a function of the allocation strength α for
different values of r and a, as obtained on a square lattice with Moore neighborhood (that is, the group size is N = 9) for a = 25, c/b = 0.1,
and T = 5.
of assets happens with a low probability, it is still sufficiently
probable for cooperators being able to resist the invasion of
defectors and thus to form a mixed dynamical equilibrium in
the stationary state. When α is further increased (third row
of Fig. 4), defectors will lose a lower amount of their asset at
the low risk probability since they put almost all their assets
into the surrounding successful groups, if only such groups
are present. The increment of α thus sustains the evolution-
ary advantage of defectors and the number of blue cooperators
consequently decreases. A few isolated islands of cooperators
can withstand the invasion of defectors because they locally
get enough support from the grouped companions, but if α in-
creases further (not shown), defectors raise to complete dom-
inance.
The two bottom rows of Fig. 4 show representative snap-
shot sequences for two different values of α, as obtained at a
relatively high risk. For low values of α (fourth row of Fig. 4),
blue cooperators do not lose their assets much and thus man-
age to have a higher net payoff then defectors. Hence, they
can form compact clusters and expand across the whole popu-
lation [23]. On the contrary, pink defectors have more neigh-
bors who are either also pink defectors or green cooperators.
Thus, they lose some of their assets by placing them in the
unsuccessful groups when α is zero or somewhat larger than
zero. Even if α is increased, blue cooperators still lose less of
their asset than other individuals, and can thus still have the
highest net payoff. Therefore they have an evolutionary ad-
vantage, and can eventually dominate the whole population.
When α is sufficiently large (bottom row of Fig. 4), both co-
operators and defectors tend to allocate their assets predom-
inantly into the successful surrounding groups. But grouped
defectors still lose some of their assets because they simply
do not have enough neighboring cooperators that would sus-
tain successful groups. Hence, blue cooperators can still ex-
pand across the whole population, although some tiny specks
of defectors manage to survive by holding on to the blue co-
operators. As a result, a few defectors survive in the sea of
cooperators.
To conclude, we report on the robustness of our findings by
investigating changes in dependence on the cost-to-benefit ra-
tio c/b, the collective target T , and the interaction structure, as
shown in Fig. 5. When the threshold value changes, as shown
in Fig. 5(a), we find that there exists an intermediate value of
the allocation strength α that maximizes the fraction of co-
operators at relatively small values of r, while the fraction
of cooperators decreases with increasing allocation strengths
for relatively large values of r. Although the range of r val-
ues for the observation of the two typical behaviors varies as
the threshold changes, as indicated by the results presented in
Fig. 5(a), our main conclusion remain unchanged. Moreover,
in Fig. 5(b), we find that our results are robust also against
the variations of cost-to-benefit ratio c/b. In particular, as the
c/b ratio increases, the evolution of cooperation is impaired,
which is in agreement with previous research [17, 23]. But
as we increase the value of the individual assets this trend is
again reversed and cooperative behavior is as pervasive as by
low c/b ratios. Lastly, in Fig. 5(c), we change the interac-
tion structure by replacing the Von Neumann neighborhood
with the Moore neighborhood. It can be observed that there
still exists an intermediate α value that maximizes the frac-
tion of cooperators at relatively small values of r, and that the
fraction of cooperators decrease with increasing α values at
relatively large r values. This indicates that our main conclu-
sions are robust also against the changes in the structure of the
interaction network.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have introduced and studied collective-risk social
dilemma games with risky assets, and we have demonstrated
how this can lead to elevated levels of cooperation in well-
mixed and structured populations. The introduction of risky
assets increases the stakes for each individual player, since in-
sufficient contributions to the common pool result not only in
the loss of personal endowments, but also in the loss of the
8assets. Thus, players are more prone to cooperating, and this
regardless of their interaction range in the population. More
precisely, we have shown that in infinite well-mixed popu-
lations new stable and unstable mixed steady states emerge,
whereby the stable mixed steady state converges to full coop-
eration as either the risk of collective failure or the amount
of risky assets increases. In finite well-mixed populations,
we have shown that the introduction of risky assets drives
the population towards configurations where cooperative be-
havior abounds. For comparison, in the absence of risky as-
sets, finite well-mixed populations are prone to spend the ma-
jority of time in configurations where defectors prevail. In
structured populations, where players have a limited interac-
tion range, we have studied an extended collective-risk so-
cial dilemma games with risky assets, where the distribution
of assets could be tuned by means of an allocation strength
parameter. Among fully rational, bounded rational and uni-
form allocation, we have identified the latter as being optimal
for the evolution of cooperation in high-risk situations. Con-
versely, in low-risk situations bounded rational allocation of
assets works best. Most surprisingly, the fully rational allo-
cation of assets only to the most successful groups, where in
principle the assets would be least prone to being lost, is never
optimal. We have explained these results with characteristic
snapshot sequences of strategy distributions in the population,
and we have identified pattern formation as being crucial for
the observed evolutionary outcomes. We have also tested the
robustness of our results with regards to variations of the cost-
to-benefit ratio, the collective target to be reached with the
contributions of players, and with regards to the variation of
the interaction structure, always observing that at least quali-
tatively our main conclusions do not change and are fully ro-
bust.
As we have emphasized in the Introduction, the consider-
ation of risky assets in the realm of the collective-risk social
dilemma game is well aligned with reality, in which it is rel-
atively straightforward to come up with examples where our
model could apply. Our research shows that, at least in the-
ory, such risky or unsecured, i.e., not immune to loss if the
collective target is not reached, assets significantly promote
cooperation and thus contribute to solving the collective-risk
social dilemma. Research based on behavioral experiments
has already considered individual assets [13], although the fo-
cus was on the interaction between wealth heterogeneity and
intermediate climate targets. The experimental results show
that, if players collectively face intermediate climate targets,
then rich players are willing to substitute for missing contribu-
tions by poor players [13]. Following this experimental study,
a theoretical work by Abou Chakra and Traulsen [26] further
showed that rich players contribute on behalf of poor players
only when their own external assets are worth protecting, and
moreover, that rich players maintain cooperation by assisting
poor players under a certain degree of uncertainty. Although
the motivation behind our work and the setup are different, we
hope that, collectively, the demonstrated importance of indi-
vidual assets will inspire more research along this line, per-
haps in the realm of other evolutionary games or in coevolu-
tionary settings.
Appendix A: Evolutionary dynamics in infinite well-mixed
populations
For studying the evolutionary dynamics in infinite well-
mixed populations, we use the replicator equation [42]. To
begin, we assume a large population, a fraction x of which is
composed of cooperators, the remaining fraction (1−x) being
defectors. Accordingly, the replicator equation is
x˙ = x(1− x)(PC − PD), (5)
where PC and PD are the average payoffs of cooperators and
defectors, respectively. Next, let groups of N individuals be
sampled randomly from the population. The average payoff
of cooperators is
PC =
N−1∑
j=0
(
N − 1
j
)
xj(1− x)N−1−jPC(j + 1), (6)
while the average payoff of defectors is
PD =
N−1∑
j=0
(
N − 1
j
)
xj(1− x)N−1−jPD(j). (7)
With these definitions, the replicator equation has two
boundary equilibria, namely x = 0 and x = 1, whereby full
defection is stable while full cooperation is not. Interior equi-
libria, on the other hand, can be determined by equating PC
and PD, thus obtaining
PC − PD =
(
N − 1
T − 1
)
xT−1(1− x)N−T (b+ a)r − c = 0.
(8)
Furthermore, to determine the interior equilibria, we study the
slope and the curvature of the functionG(x), which we define
as
G(x) =
(
N − 1
T − 1
)
xT−1(1− x)N−T . (9)
Note that PC −PD = 0 is equivalent to G(x) = c/[r(a+ b)].
We thus compute
G′(x) = −
(
N − 1
T − 1
)
xT−2(1−x)N−T−1[1+(N−1)x−T ],
(10)
from where it follows that, since N > 2, G′(x) has a unique
internal root at xˆ = (T − 1)/(N − 1) when 1 < T < N .
Moreover, G′(x) > 0 for x < xˆ and G′(x) < 0 for x > xˆ.
Accordingly, G(xˆ) is a unique interior maximum of G(x).
Solving the equation G(x) = c/[r(a + b)] thus yields the
following conclusions:
1. When G(xˆ) > c/[r(a + b)], Eq. (5) has two interior
equilibria, denoted by x∗1 and x
∗
2 with x
∗
1 < xˆ < x
∗
2.
Since G′(x) > 0 for x < xˆ and G′(x) < 0 for x > xˆ,
x∗1 is an unstable equilibrium and x
∗
2 is a stable equilib-
rium.
92. When G(xˆ) = c/[r(a + b)], Eq. (5) has only one inte-
rior equilibrium xˆ, which is a tangent point, and is thus
unstable.
3. WhenG(xˆ) < c/[r(a+b)], Eq. (5) has no interior equi-
libria.
When T = 1 or T = N , however, for c/[r(a + b)] ≥ 1
Eq. (5) has no interior equilibria. While for c/[r(a+ b)] < 1,
Eq. (5) has only one interior equilibrium x∗. Note that x∗ =
1−{c/[r(a+ b)]}1/(N−1) is stable for T = 1 since G′(x∗) <
0, while x∗ = {c/[r(a + b)]}1/(N−1) is unstable for T = N
since G′(x∗) > 0.
Appendix B: Evolutionary dynamics in finite well-mixed
populations
For studying the evolutionary dynamics in finite well-mixed
populations, we consider a population of finite size Z. Here
the average payoffs of cooperators and defectors in the popu-
lation with k cooperators are respectively given by
fC(k) =
(
Z − 1
N − 1
)−1 N−1∑
j=0
(
k − 1
j
)(
Z − k
N − j − 1
)
· PC(j + 1), (11)
and
fD(k) =
(
Z − 1
N − 1
)−1 N−1∑
j=0
(
k
j
)(
Z − k − 1
N − j − 1
)
· PD(j). (12)
Next, we adopt the pair-wise comparison rule to study the evo-
lutionary dynamics, based on which we assume that player y
adopts the strategy of player z with a probability given by the
Fermi function
p = [1 + e−β(Pz−Py)]−1, (13)
where β is the intensity of selection that determines the level
of uncertainty in the strategy adoption process [36, 37]. With-
out loosing generality, we use β = 2.0 throughout this work.
With these definitions, the probability that the number of
cooperators in the population increases or decreases by one is
T±(k) =
k
Z
Z − k
Z
[1 + e∓β[fC(k)−fD(k)]]−1. (14)
Following previous research [17], we further introduce the
mutation-selection process into the update rule, and compute
the stationary distribution as the key quantity that determines
the evolutionary dynamics in finite well-mixed populations.
We note that, in the presence of mutations, the population will
never fixate in any of the two possible absorbing states. Thus,
the transition matrix of the complete Markov chain is
M = [pu,v]
T
(Z+1)×(Z+1), (15)
where pu,v = 0 if |u − v| > 1, otherwise pu,u+1 = (1 −
µ)T+(u) + µ(Z − u)/Z, pu,u−1 = (1 − µ)T−(u) + µu/Z
and pu,u = 1− pu,u+1 − pu,u−1. Accordingly, the stationary
distribution of the population, that is the average fraction of
the time the population spends in each of the Z + 1 states, is
given by the eigenvector of the eigenvalue 1 of the transition
matrix M [43]. In the Results Section, Fig. 1(b) is obtained
by using µ = 0.01.
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